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 One afternoon in 1995, two British friends met in a mountain village in Switzer-
land. Peter Walker, Director of  Disaster Policy at the International Federation of  
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and Nicholas Stockton, Emergency 
Director with Oxfam, were once again ruminating on an old problem: Anyone 
could pretend to be a humanitarian. This problem had grown since the end of  the 
Cold War: While superpowers and states were keeping distant from the planet’s 
hot spots, everyone else was stepping in. Everyone was creating NGOs: Clergy-
men, TV hosts, aging billionaires, and adolescent rock stars. After the Rwandan 
genocide, more than 200 NGOs went to Goma. This intervention did not go well. 
Although international NGOs had been backed by high-tech army logistics and 
massive funding, they had been defeated by medieval diseases like dysentery and 
cholera. Even worse: The collapse of  the humanitarians in Goma had been on the 
front pages of  international media for several weeks. Venerable organizations such 
as Oxfam and the IFRC were struggling for legitimacy. Stockton and Walker had 
a long conversation while enjoying the view of  Lake Geneva. After a few hours 
and “a six pack of  beer” they had a plan: They would create “quality standards” 
for humanitarian action. 1 
 After all, almost all other industries already had standards that guarantee that 
products and services attain a certain quality that consumers can expect. The 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the headquarters of  which 
were not far from Walker’s office in Geneva, was an inspiring example: Its famous 
“ISO norms” applied to a broad range of  goods and services, from the size of  
paper sheets, to the diameter of  wool fibers, to the 4-digit PINs of  international 
banks. Why not use the same kind of  standards for the goods and services deliv-
ered by the humanitarian industry? That would make humanitarian aid more 
reliable, more accountable, and more predictable. The main question was: What 
does it take to survive a catastrophe? How many calories does a human being 
need? How many liters of  water, how many square meters of  tent, how many 
blankets? Do they need mobile phones? Condoms? Cigarettes? Where is the line 
under which less is nothing and more is optional? What is negotiable – and what 
shouldn’t be? 
 Stockton and Walker titled their paper “Towards Quality and Accountability 
Standards in Humanitarian Relief.” 2 They were neither lawyers nor specialists 
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in standardization processes, but they had many years of  experience in aid relief, 
good knowledge of  aid agencies, and a large network of  friends in European and 
American NGOs. Stockton had a teacher personality (he had in fact taught soci-
ology in the 1970s), while Walker acted as a coach, keeping everyone motivated 
and frequently giving pep talks. Both were good at bringing people together and 
pitching to donors and journalists. They brought their paper to the board of  the 
Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, a forum of  seven of  the most 
influential NGOs, and started the work of  convincing their colleagues. 3 
 Twenty years later, the Sphere standards have become a key reference in the 
humanitarian world. NGOs have adopted them. United Nations agencies require 
their partners to use them. Donors like the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and the European Union recommend them. 4 Some governmental agencies draw 
extensively on Sphere to shape their national disaster plans. 5 The Sphere stan-
dards are used in relief  programs, and in the planning, monitoring, and evaluation 
of  thousands of  aid projects. They are taught to managers in headquarters, to aid 
workers in the field, and to graduate students in universities. 
 The first version of  the Sphere Project’s “Minimum Standards in Humanitarian 
Response” was published in 1998. The key argument was that humanitarian aid 
was, at least partly, quantifiable. 6 The project was about defining “a minimum for 
survival.” 7 The Sphere standards were backed by indicators meant to help to mea-
sure their fulfillment. For instance, a standard for water stated: “All people have 
safe and equitable access to a sufficient quantity of  water for drinking, cooking and 
personal and domestic hygiene.” This standard was informed by indicators such 
as “At least 15 liters of  water per person and per day is collected.” 8 Another stan-
dard, on food requirements, said that “The food basket and rations are designed to 
bridge the gap between the affected population’s requirement and their own food 
sources.” The indicators added some planning estimates: “2,100 kcal per person,” 
including “10–12%” protein, “17%” fat, and an “adequate micronutrient intake.” 
Another standard required that “Families have access to household utensils, soap 
for personal hygiene and tools for their dignity and well-being,” with indicators 
like “Each person has: 1 eating plate, 1 metal spoon, 1 mug” and “Each person 
has access to 250 g of  soap per month.” The Sphere standards offered many more 
quantifiable indicators, including a “maximum of  20 people per toilet,” and the 
criteria that “toilets are no more than . . . one minute’s walk” from living quarters. 
They codified the amount of  water for hand washing in public toilets (“1–2 liters/
user/day”), for toilet flushing (“20–40 liters/user/day”), for anal hygiene (“1–2 
liters/person/day”), and for animals (“5 liters/small animal/day”). They indicated 
the minimum sheltered area that should be available per person (“3.5–4.5 m2”) as 
well as the average daily requirement of  Vitamin A (“1,666 International Units”). 
They gave several definitions of  acute malnutrition (“80% of  median weight-for-
height” or “<12.5 MUAC [mid-upper arm circumference]”) and of  excess mortal-
ity (“a crude mortality rate higher than 1 death per 10,000 persons per day”). They 
also provided a tolerable threshold for cholera fatality rates (“below 1%”) and a 
description of  the best way to bury dead bodies (“mass graves must be located at 
least 30 meters from groundwater sources”). 9 
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 According to some, the Sphere standards have been a “radical” invention, “a 
landmark” in the evolution of  the humanitarian system, and the “end of  the age 
of  humanitarian innocence,” perhaps “one of  the most important developments 
in the practice of  human rights in the last 30 years.” Stockton and Walker are 
remembered as the “fathers” of  Sphere, while their teammates are deemed “mav-
ericks” and “groundbreakers.” 10 The Sphere standards are said to have led to noth-
ing less than a shift in the humanitarian paradigm – in the sense of  “Kuhn’s thesis 
of  a paradigm.” 11 According to some, Sphere was “a revolution.” 12 
 In fact, the Sphere standards are probably the most influential attempt to express 
an individualist and universalist ontology of  needs in the language of  numbers. 
There is no doubt about the immodest ambition of  the standards: They were 
about “meeting critical human needs,” 13 “urgent survival needs,” 14 and describing 
“what people really need to stay alive.” 15 The Sphere Handbook included many 
figures that were published well before the Sphere Project. 16 But the Sphere Hand-
book claimed to be the foremost book on humanitarianism: A single document 
that offered figures on water, food, shelter, and health. Its definition of  needs reso-
nated with a common-sense definition, as well as with the individualist ontology 
of  Maslow’s hierarchy. 17 And just like Maslow’s definition, the Sphere standards 
defined a global horizon. The Sphere standards claimed to be applicable for all, 
whether one lived in a city or a village, in a rich or in a poor country, in the tropics 
or in the polar circles. The standards were to be used “anywhere in the world.” 18 
 Figure 4.1 Covers of  the Sphere Handbook (2000 and 2004 editions). 
 Source: The Sphere Project: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, 
2000 and 2004. Courtesy of  The Sphere Project 
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 It is therefore no surprise that the bulk of  the literature on Sphere celebrates the 
introduction of  the standards as a major advance. For most authors, standard-
ization was the result of  a broad process of  the “professionalization” of  aid. 19 
According to this literature, the standardization of  aid participates in the improve-
ment of  “global governance” through the improvement of  “accountability,” “reli-
ability,” and “efficiency.” 20 
 On the other hand, for most of  the critical literature, the “standardization” 
is nothing less than a step towards the privatization of  aid. In this line of  think-
ing, the end of  the Cold War was a decisive moment in the unleashing of  neo-
liberalism. Thus, it is no wonder that humanitarian entrepreneurs mistook aid 
beneficiaries for “consumers,” that they reduced aid relief  to the “delivery” of  
goods and services, that they fueled the “McDonaldization” of  humanitarianism 
and the “McSpherization” of  the world. 21 Critics have reason to underline that 
standardization is not a neutral process, but that it is rather a product of  power 
relationships, and that it, in turn, contributes to the perpetuation of  these power 
relationships. Neoliberalism’s critics are right in showing that the quantification of  
needs resembles neoliberal thinking in some respects, with its passion for individu-
alization, consumption, and competition. 22 However, the  homo globalensis described 
by the Sphere standards cannot be reduced to neoliberalism’s  homo oeconomicus . The 
anthropology of  humanitarians goes further, and that is precisely what, according 
to itself, forms the basis of  its legitimacy: Humanity is not reduced to competition 
because, beyond a certain threshold, competition no longer has a place to exist; 
competition must give way to assistance. The Sphere Project’s challenge was to fix 
that threshold. 
 The perspective adopted in this chapter is different. Contrary to nearly the 
entire literature on Sphere, the point here is not to examine whether the standards 
are good or bad, whether they have had a positive or negative impact on humani-
tarian aid, or furthermore whether their creation has constituted a “revolution” 
in aid. 23 Here, through the example of  the Sphere standards, the aim is to under-
stand how a small group of  people proposed, with a certain success, a universalist 
quantification of  needs that has been the object of  debates in the headquarters of  
the largest NGOs over the last 20 years. 
 The perspective adopted here is thus not normative, but historical. The ver-
sion of  history proposed by the proponents of  Sphere is problematic because it 
is teleological. The Sphere manual tells us that the humanitarian standards are 
universal because they are the object of  a broad agreement among humanitarians. 
The illusion would be to believe that the Sphere team first sought the best pos-
sible standards, and that it then succeeded in convincing the world to adopt these 
standards. In practice, they did the opposite. These standards were not the point 
of  departure for the discussion about interests; they were, conversely, the result of  
 negotiations that dealt with the interests of  organizations, technical details, and stra-
tegic positions, all at the same time. The conventional wisdom gives the impres-
sion that the “technicians” come to agreement quickly (because they always bow 
to science), while the “decision-makers” argue and must be patiently convinced 
(because they defend the political interests of  their organizations). However, at 
no moment did the experts involved in the Sphere Project create a distinction 
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between “technique” and “politics,” except at the very end of  the process, at just 
the moment when the work of  separating the  indicators and the  interests has been 
accomplished. Up to this final moment, all the actors, all the experts, all the consul-
tants discussed the numbers, values, interests, conflicted in a jumble. The negotia-
tions were neither cold nor dispassionate; they were, on the contrary – as Stockton 
himself  says – “furious.” As this chapter shows, “technique” brings to humanitari-
anism no “neutrality” that would be external to humanitarianism due to its being 
generated by the objectivity of  science. The “neutrality” of  the standards is only 
obtained at the end of  the chain, once all arguments about the standards have 
been exhausted, once a “consensus” was obtained. 
 How has that “consensus,” of  which the proponents of  Sphere avail themselves, 
been obtained? 24 All the available accounts up to the present rely on retrospective 
testimony given by the proponents and critics of  Sphere. 25 These accounts are 
thus prisoners of  the testimonies, which are largely contradictory: On the one 
hand, they present standardization as a natural consequence of  the professional-
ization of  humanitarian aid. On the other hand, they present the proponents of  
Sphere as visionaries. This literature therefore shows us Sphere proponents who 
would be at once all-powerful (capable of  leading a revolution) and utterly power-
less, because they would be content with merely bringing to pass that which was all 
along the hidden destiny of  the “humanitarian community.” The official account 
of  the actors of  Sphere thus leads to a surprising contradiction, made evident in 
some of  the statements of  Sphere’s creators – epitomized by Peter Walker’s speak-
ing of  the Sphere standards as an invention at once “radical and inevitable.” 26 
 To escape this impasse, one must understand how the Sphere standards were 
elaborated before they became “universal.” One must go to Geneva, into a down-
stairs apartment on Avenue Giuseppe Motta, 27 ask for Juan Michel’s forbearance, 
find the keys to the cellar, sort through the boxes numbered 1 to 33 above the older 
labels (“clothing,” “kitchen”), and find a boxcutter to get past the brown tape. 
Then, one can start researching those documents that permit the retracing of  the 
origin of  the standards. In these boxes, one can find the minutes of  the Sphere 
Management Committee Meetings, the weekly reports by the Sphere manag-
ers, the successive drafts of  the Sphere Handbook, some periodic reports for the 
donors, and, most importantly, a broad range of  emails written or received by 
the managers. 28 Through these emails, one can start to grasp the uncertainties, the 
trial and error, and the successive attempts that resulted in the definition of  these 
“minimum standards.” One starts to understand the controversies, conflicts, and 
arbitrage between the experts. One starts to realize that, notwithstanding what the 
proponents of  Sphere may say today, science was not able to play the role of  arbi-
ter that it was meant to take on. A few minutes’ walk away from Avenue Motta, at 
the international headquarters of  MSF on Rue de Lausanne, the reports, periodic 
bulletins, and emails from the same period give a different version of  the history. 
 Humanitarianism after Goma 
 What was the problem to which Stockton and Walker wished to respond? In the 
mid-1990s, the big humanitarian agencies were faced with two major problems. 
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The first was the decrease in available financing. 29 The funds set aside by the 
United States for emergency aid were reduced by two-thirds between 1994 and 
1997, 30 and the funds designated by ECHO, the largest humanitarian backer, 
plunged as well. 31 Funds from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) that were earmarked for development went from 62 billion 
USD in 1992 to 48 billion in 1999. 32 Yet at the same time, the number of  NGOs 
increased rapidly: There were 6,000 international non-governmental organiza-
tions (INGOs) in 1990, and 26,000 in 1999. 33 The old humanitarian agencies like 
Oxfam (Stockton’s agency, created in 1942) and the Red Cross (Walker’s, which 
dates to 1864) suddenly found themselves in competition for funds with a growing 
number of  new competitors. 
 The decrease in humanitarian financing demonstrated a second problem: A 
general decrease in confidence in NGOs. After the Cold War, NGOs started to 
intervene in crises at uncertain borders (Sudan, Afghanistan, Congo, Georgia, 
Chechnya, Sri Lanka, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, Colombia, Kosovo); crises 
were thus considered to be less clear-cut (one spoke of  “new crises,” “new wars,” 
or “complex emergency situations”), and the legitimacy of  humanitarian agencies 
was no longer as evident as before. 34 What did NGO personnel, who were con-
trolled neither by states nor by the UN’s hierarchy, do in foreign lands? The large 
humanitarian agencies had a harder and harder time distinguishing themselves 
from the numerous other actors who pretended to be “humanitarian.” 
 The crisis in Goma was paradigmatic of  this crisis of  legitimacy affecting large 
aid organizations. 35 Between April and June 1994, the Rwandan army, Interhamwe 
militias, and Hutu Power murdered at least 800,000 moderate Tutsi and Hutu 
Rwandans. On 4 July, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR) took Kigali and ended 
the genocide, but this victory provoked the departure of  two million Rwandans. 36 
In just one week, from 14–18 July 1994, some 850,000 refugees left the country, 
most crossing the border between Gisenyi and Goma, to Zaire. 37 International 
organizations and NGOs therefore rushed to Kivu, where they constructed large 
refugee camps. Western governments, incapable of  ending genocide, then over-
invested in humanitarian aid. 38 
 Competition between humanitarian agencies was played out under the media’s 
gaze. In July 1994, about 500 journalists found themselves in Goma, and news 
about the refugee camps broke into  Le Monde ,  The Guardian , and  The New York Times 
for several weeks. 39 One observer noted: “Goma looks as if  it is hosting some kind 
of  competition or election. Oxfam, Goal, Care, World Vision, WFP, UNHCR 
blare out their names and logos like soft drink manufacturers.” 40 Even though 
Hutu militias seized the camps, and NGOs were faced with cholera epidemics, 
the complicity of  states was relegated to the background. “Everybody was doing 
‘blame the humanitarians,’” as one analyst sums it up. 41 The political and military 
crisis was represented in public opinion as a health crisis. “In the general public’s 
memory, the Rwanda crisis was people who die of  cholera.” 42 
 The critique of  humanitarianism was nourished by controversies among humani-
tarian organizations. 43 In November 1994, MSF France left the Kivu camps in a 
flurry of  attention. 44 MSF asserted that humanitarian aid in the camps actually 
profits the perpetrators of  genocide. 45 According to their diagnostic assessment, 
128 Standards: The Sphere Project and the universalization of  the minimum after Goma
the former Rwandan government had orchestrated the Rwandan population’s 
exodus to create “humanitarian sanctuaries” outside of  the country, permitting 
them to reconstitute a military force to attack Kigali. 46 The former functionar-
ies, militia leaders, and mayors controlled the camps, assassinated their political 
opponents, and diverted food deliveries, which they distributed to their relatives 
and allies. MSF France denounced the NGOs that remained, claming that they 
were thus “complicit” in the manipulation of  humanitarian aid. 47 
 MSF was not the only NGO to express doubts about humanitarianism in Goma. 
CARE Germany refused to coordinate its actions with other NGOs. 48 Save the 
Children UK refused to go to Rwanda. NGOs, UN agencies, and governments 
blamed each other for the failure of  aid. 49 The year 1994 ended with a  New York 
Times article harshly criticizing humanitarian NGOs. It read: “the foreign medical 
volunteers did not know how to treat children with severe diarrhea,” and gives 
other examples of  missteps: “One charity, AmeriCares . . . shipped 10,000 cases 
of  Gatorade [a drink for athletes] to Goma.” Another one, Operation Blessing, 
an organization financed by a TV show hosted by the right-wing evangelist Pat 
Robertson, spent “more on flying its volunteers, which included television crews, 
to Zaire, than on anything else.” The article concluded: “compassion was not 
always backed by efficiency.” 50 
 Faced with these harsh critics against humanitarian aid, Western governments 
organized a collective evaluation of  relief  in Rwanda: The  Joint Evaluation of  Emergency 
Assistance to Rwanda (JEEAR). The project assembled representatives of  20 gov-
ernments, 11 international organizations and UN agencies, and 7 large NGOs. 51 
For several months 20 consultants interrogated 620 experts and witnesses. 52 Their 
report laid the blame on the NGOs, listing countless errors that were commited in 
the Great Lakes: Inexperienced staff  members, ignorance of  local languages, the 
dispensing of  antibiotics for all sorts of  illnesses, unsupervised injections, etc. 53 A 
“number of  NGOs,” the report concluded, “performed in an unprofessional and 
irresponsible manner that resulted not only in duplication and wasted resources 
but may also have contributed to an unnecessary loss of  life.” 54 Added to the vic-
tims of  genocide were 100,000 deaths that “may be attributed to disease outbreaks 
and conditions such as severe dehydration that may be considered to have been 
either preventable or at least more controllable.” 55 
 The humanitarian donors – USAID, DFID, WHO, UNHCR – reacted promptly 
to the NGO’s documented fiasco: They introduced new tools to better control 
their implementing partners: Frameworks for project evaluation and monitoring, 
and the accreditation of  NGOs authorized to respond to calls for bids. 56 The 
donors’ message was clear: If  the NGOs were not able to regulate themselves, 
governmental authorities would have to do it for them. 
 The  Joint Evaluation of  Emergency Assistance to Rwanda proposed its own way out. 
The first proposition was the creation of  an independent institution that serves 
as a “monitor” and “ombudsman” of  humanitarian aid. 57 This institution would 
permit aid beneficiaries to assert their grievances about humanitarian aid them-
selves. The second proposition was to develop “a set of  standards” for humanitar-
ian aid. This solution was an explicit nod to the “Standards Project” proposed 
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earlier by Nicholas Stockton and Peter Walker (who were themselves members 
of  the Steering Committee of  the JEEAR). This was not, however, a new idea: 
The strategy of  the “codification” of  aid had been the object of  different projects 
in the last couple of  years – the “Turku Declaration of  Minimum Humanitar-
ian Standards” (1990); 58 the “Providence Principles” of  InterAction (1993) ,59 the 
American “Mohonk Criteria” (1994); 60 the British “Code of  Best Practice in the 
Management and Support of  Aid Personnel” 61 (1994) and the “Code of  Con-
duct” (1994) 62 were all recent attempts to codify humanitarian aid. 
 Thus, in the mid- 1990s, several groups of  experts and NGOs were working 
on different codification projects – sometimes cooperating, sometimes competing 
with each other. In 1997, a forum was created to coordinate these initiatives: The 
Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian 
Action (ALNAP), 63 hosted by the Overseas Development Institute in London. The 
British context was suitable for experimenting with new humanitarian tools: Newly 
elected Prime Minister Tony Blair was promoting a “New Humanitarianism,” 
whose definition was close to the standardization projects underway in NGOs: 64 
“All people have the same basic needs,” wrote the British government: “fresh air 
to breathe, clean water to drink, uncontaminated food to eat.” 65 
 One of  the key questions discussed by ALNAP was: How can we maintain the 
diversity of  the humanitarian field while at the same time control the access to the 
donors and to the target populations? This was a collective attempt to take back 
control of  the public image of  humanitarian aid that had suffered from bad press 
in Goma. Stockton and Walker’s solution drew on two traditions of  humanitar-
ian aid: A tradition of  reflection on the judicial or quasi-judicial rules often called 
“humanitarian principles,” the best-known example of  which was the “Funda-
mental Principles” published by the Red Cross movement (1921, 1928, 1948, 
1952, 1965), and the tradition of  methodological reflection on aid techniques. 
All the large humanitarian organizations had produced their own “handbooks” 
for aid practitioners (WHO 1978, UNDRO 1982, UNHCR 1982, Cuny 1983, 
Oxfam 1985, UNICEF 1986, MSF 1997, etc.). 66 The best-known was probably 
Oxfam’s (which was Stockton’s NGO) about which one commentator had written: 
“For Christianity there is the Bible, for Islam the Koran, for Oxfam there is the 
 Field Directors’ Handbook .” 67 
 Stockton and Walker wished to reunite these two traditions by putting together 
a “humanitarian chart” that would re-establish judicial norms, with a series of  
technical indicators for several intervention sectors (food and nutrition, water 
and sanitation, shelter and site, health and medical aid). But their ambition went 
much further: Once the Minimum Standards were published, the NGOs would 
have to show that they respect them (“compliance”), and they would have to reg-
ister (“registry”). Their idea was to give the most binding force possible to these 
indicators, which would eventually be “debated and passed by the UN General 
Assembly” – that is, the highest decision-making body of  world governance. 
“Once approved by the General Assembly,” they proposed, “governments could 
then be encouraged to integrate such standards into their national legislation.” 68 
As we will see, the end result would be far from the initial promises. There would 
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be neither a registry nor endorsement by the UN General Assembly. There would 
be, however, a broad set of  “universal” standards and indicators by the end of  the 
self-set deadline of  autumn 1998. 69 
 Starting the Sphere Project: Convincing (1996–1997) 
 Stockton and Walker’s first step was not to draft a set of  standards. Their first 
step was to find allies within the NGO communities. They convinced a handful 
of  European colleagues in Geneva (at the Steering Committee for Humanitarian 
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 Figure 4.2  The 1990s: A decade of  competing codification projects. 
Source: ©Glasman
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headquarters of  InterAction). 71 With them, they founded a “Management Com-
mittee” with 14 representatives from NGO groups who would meet regularly in 
Geneva, Washington, Oxford, or Brussels .72 
 These 14 persons represented a broad spectrum of  organizations. It was a 
network of  networks: SCHR, InterAction, ICVA, MSF, ICRC, and VOICE 73 
were the largest non-governmental organizations involved in humanitarian aid. 
It was somewhat as if  a group of  experts attempting to rewrite the rules of  
sports ethics assembled FIFA, the NBA, and the NFL. The NGOs represented 
in this Management Committee were present in countless hospitals, refugee 
camps, schools, dioceses, parishes, and community centers around the world. 
One may think about Save the Children’s 24,000 employees; Doctors Without 
Borders’ 30,000 doctors, nurses and logisticians; the Salvation Army World 
Service Office’s 50,000 “officers” and “soldiers”; or the 450,000 employees 
and 17 million volunteers of  the International Federation of  the Red Cross and 
Red Crescent, distributed across 190 countries. The German branch of  Caritas 
alone claims to be able to mobilize up to 617,000 employees and 500,000 
volunteers. 74 Stockton and Walker thus assured themselves of  a considerable 
relay network for their “Standards,” long before any of  these standards were 
actually written. 
 Was it then time to write a draft of  the Standards? Not yet. The second step 
was to convince the donors. 75 In 1997, several large donors gave up to 100,000 
USD (Australia, Denmark, Netherlands, United States, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, ECHO). 76 The challenge for Stockton and Walker was not 
only to line up funding: It was rather to make the project credible by involving 
the maximum number of  donors. But to convince the donors, compromises had 
to be made, as well as the first changes to the initial project. The United States 
Office of  Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) demanded, for example, modi-
fications to the text of  the project: The Minimum Standards must not say that 
catastrophe victims were “entitled” to receive assistance, because “entitlement 
[is a] politically loaded term in an American political context, and OFDA will not 
finance a project which incorporates the word in its objectives.” 77 In July 1997, 
two months after the presentation of  the project to ALNAP, there was still no 
draft of  the “Minimum Standards,” but the players already started to negotiate 
the outcome of  the project. 
 In July 1997, Stockton and Walker’s team got to work in a small office in Geneva. 
Peter Walker, the project coordinator, was supported by one project manager, 78 
and five “sector managers” (water and sanitation, food security, nutrition, health, 
shelter and site). 79 Together, they continued to the third step. Writing the Stan-
dards? Not yet! Doing publicity was more urgent. The project was given a name: 80 
“Sphere,” which was meant to recall “the image of  the globe.” 81 Then it was given 
a logo. Then they produced business cards, a letterhead, a newsletter, a website, 
and of  course the indispensable tool of  the 1990s: Overhead transparencies. The 
Sphere Project increased the meetings with donors, telephone appeals, and visits 
to international conferences. 82 Its members distributed their newsletter, sent out 
their “progress reports” and “press releases,” wrote articles, gave interviews, and 
participated in “coffee klatches” with journalists. 
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 The message was strategically adapted to each audience: To Europeans, one 
spoke of  human rights, but to Americans, one spoke of  technical standards. An 
American representative of  Sphere explained to Stockton and Walker: “The dog-
matic approach may be viable in Switzerland. It is not acceptable here.” 83 
 The worldview from Washington is not that from Oxford and IFRC head-
quarters . . . We must be guided by local sensitivities in presenting the proj-
ect . . . From this side of  the Atlantic, this project is about identifying technical 
standards and best practices, not expanding international law or establish-
ing benchmarks to be used by some authority to judge the quality of  NGO 
work. 84 
 The Sphere Project’s communication strategy was carefully cultivated. One 
addressed “different publics” in “different manners.” 85 “The theory of  diffusion of  
innovation” was invoked to justify the adaptation of  the message. 86 Every source 
of  support was drawn upon to convince new sources of  support. 87 In the autumn 
of  1997, not a single “Minimum Standard” was settled nor a single chapter of  the 
handbook drafted, 88 but the Sphere Project was already enjoying a positive image 
in the press. 
 “Furious negotiations” (1997–1998) 89 
 Eight months before the deadline, the time had come to write the standards. 
Everyone was asked to “react quite fast.” 90 The writing began. The first step was 
for the “sector manager” to draft a sectorial chapter. To write it, they drew on 
readings and on the expertise of  their NGO. Secondly, they sent the draft to a 
small “working group,” with whom they regularly met. For example, the sector 
manager for the “Nutrition” chapter regularly met with eight nutritionists from 
large humanitarian organizations, and then solicited a “peer group” of  22 special-
ists via email with specific questions on the sub-themes of  the chapter. Thirdly, she 
sent the draft to a large number of  experts. The sector manager for “Nutrition,” 
for example, sent their text to an “e-mail group” of  “103 nutrition experts from 
around the world” (NGO personnel, government advisers, technicians, consul-
tants, academics, etc.). The objective was to consult the greatest possible number 
of  experts in order to ensure the standards’ universality. “It is imperative that our 
document be truly global,” one manager wrote: “There should be as much input 
from the South as from the North.” 91 However, there was a limit to this logic of  
inclusion: The chosen experts had to possess “the ability and willingness to com-
municate in English.” 92 
 In spring 1998, the Sphere team thus emailed the first drafts of  the handbook 
to hundreds of  experts all around the world. Many of  the emails did not receive 
any response .93 NGO experts were already swamped with demands of  participa-
tion in competing projects. 94 Many had other, more urgent worries: Refugees from 
Zaire, the war in Kosovo, Hurricane Mitch. One expert based in South Sudan 
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others took the time to respond. Some were encouraging: “a big piece of  work”; 
“you have done a fantastic job”; “an excellent effort”; “excellent work”; “my con-
gratulations to the Sphere Project . . . it seems very well done”; “I support the con-
cept which Sphere is trying to implement”; “congratulations to you!”; “In writing 
the document you have spoken to hundreds of  people, heard a million different 
opinions, tried to accommodate people’s view wherever possible, and tried not to 
stray too far from the original objectives. It’s an almost impossible task.” 
 However, some experts expressed their doubts: “I have been thinking a lot 
about the Sphere criteria . . . I am worried,” 96 wrote a renowned nutritionist; “The 
standards for food aid are somewhat vague and unrealistic,” 97 wrote another. “I 
am a little disturbed that the key indicators are at times vague and unmeasur-
able,” 98 wrote a third. 
 Following the Sphere correspondence enables to extract oneself  from the proj-
ect’s teleology, and to dismantle the illusion of  consensual discussions. Let us take 
the response of  this epidemiologist, who commented on one of  the first Minimum 
Standards documents. As one standard proposed ensuring that “at least 50% of  
outreach health workers are women,” he commented: “Give me a break. Don’t 
you think this is a little bit prescriptive?” 99 Where one standard provides for the use 
of  “checklists,” he answered: “Can’t you just see the director of  Dogood Interna-
tional who has completely screwed up his operation saying ‘but we used a check-
list’?” 100 “The last thing that is needed,” he concluded, “is a document composed 
of  fluff  – this project is meant to correct a serious problem, not to make people 
feel better the next time something happens!” 101 The Sphere managers collected 
comments that were often quite harsh: “that’s a pretty amazing statement!”; “I 
don’t think so”; “Is this serious or just a throwaway?”; and “I have told you that I 
think this is WRONG!!!” 102 
 To follow the drafts of  the Minimum Standards and the commentaries is to 
measure the distance between the initial project and the final product; it is to per-
ceive the doubts expressed by the experts, the possibilities discarded in discussions, 
and the decisions finally made by the managers. The experts discussed alterna-
tives. What is the minimum dietary energy requirement? 1,900 kcal per person, 
per day was proposed. Then 2,300. Then 2,070. 103 The ICRC recommended 
2,400 kcal, but the World Food Programme said 2,100. 104 In the end, the sector 
manager followed the last recommendation: The threshold was fixed at 2,100 kcal 
per person, per day, all the while indicating that this number was a theoretical 
average – it was calculated for individuals of  a “sedentary population” who had a 
“normal demography” in an “ambient temperature above 20 ° C.” 105 
 For each standard evoked, a multitude of  possible responses was envisioned. 
How much water does a human being need? One expert proposed 2–3 liters per 
day. 106 Another proposed 20 liters. 107 One was thinking of  the quantity necessary 
for drinking, the other included water necessary for cooking and bathing. In many 
countries, a fixed indicator of  20 liters would be impossible to realize, according 
to one expert, who thus suggested fixing the threshold at 15 liters. This decision 
is typical of  the trial and error experienced by Sphere: Taking an indicator high 
enough to incite the humanitarian actors to do better, but low enough that it had 
Standards: The Sphere Project and the universalization of  the minimum after Goma 137
a realistic chance of  being attained. “I found,” he said, “that 50% of  the countries 
could meet more than 15 liters a day and 50% couldn’t. That to me meant that 
this is where the indicator should be.” 108 
 Each decision for or against an indicator was, at the same time, a diplomatic 
decision for or against an organization. For example, what is the minimum space 
needed by a refugee living in a camp? The WHO responded: “Room for 30 m2 
per person excluding infrastructure.” The UNHCR responded: “a total of  150 
m2 per household.” 109 To choose an indicator meant necessarily to take sides. It 
was to wade into the debate among experts, among organizations, among nations: 
“Should we be suggesting separate standards for water collection containers and 
for water storage containers – as [does] UNHCR – or should we have a standard 
for the two together (often the same containers are used for both) – as [does] 
MSF?” 110 
 One could believe that the indicators are  scientific – and they are, insofar as the 
experts justify their positions by making reference to scientific authorities (renowned 
scientific personalities, universities, scientific journals). But the indicators are never 
 only scientific. This does not mean that they are entirely  arbitrary . In their decisions, 
humanitarian experts invoked both reason and force at once, including the argu-
ments of  academics and those of  lobbyists, the opinions of  researchers and those 
of  donors. The experts were aware that the donors’ willingness to fund relief  aid 
was limited: The Standards’ calculations took that into account. How many blan-
kets per person? “Maybe at first only three blankets for the average family. This 
is not fair as the family size can differ considerably, but time and urgency and the 
availability decide.” 111 Some argued that “insecticide treated nets must be distrib-
uted to all families.” But others asked, “how feasible is this? Can Sphere mention 
 one donor who is willing to support this cost?” 112 It would be equally desirable to 
guarantee a container of  40 liters of  water to each household living in a camp. 
“That would be wonderful,” wrote one expert, but “can we convince the donors 
to support this level of  cost?” 113 
 All discussions on the content of  the Standards thus engendered a balance 
of  force and legitimacy among the institutions involved in their elaboration. For 
example, the weight of  the role of  the American Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) in the Standards on Health was criticized by an expert: “The 
hand of  our friends in Atlanta [CDC headquarters] is seen heavily in this section 
and I disagree. So do you, but you just don’t know it yet.” The vision of  the world 
conveyed by the Standards is not neutral – it reflects the point of  view of  certain 
institutions. The same expert wrote to the Sphere managers: “You place a lot 
of  emphasis on women’s problems. How can you if  you don’t know how many 
women there are? I know the CDC doesn’t think gender issues are important in 
the emergency phase, but I do and I base my opinion on data.” 114 The positions 
taken in these expert discussions never easily separate the technical and political 
realms. As one expert put it: “You can’t patch things together here – you have to 
have a clear philosophical approach and take a stand!” 115 Setting a food diary, a 
minimal space for shelter, a minimal water requirement, or any threshold meant 
always making a choice among different institutions. 
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 The correspondence on gender and sexuality epitomized this indivisibility of  
technique and politics. A member of  the International Pregnancy Advisory Ser-
vices writes: “reproductive health is largely absent in this document.” 116 The 
question of  abortion was in fact not brought up in the first draft of  the Sphere 
Handbook. Yet the problem of  “unsafe abortion” was, according to this expert, 
“one of  the two leading causes of  maternal mortality and morbidity under ‘nor-
mal’ circumstances.” What about “prenatal care” and “condom distribution”? 117 
Another expert from an American agency was astonished that the standards did 
not mention HIV/AIDS: “two health areas which are conspicuous in its absence,” 
he wrote, “are any discussion of  family planning and protection against and treat-
ment of  STDs, including AIDS.” 118 Several American NGOs insisted that sexu-
ally transmitted infections would be taken into account in the standards. But this 
was a divisive question. 119 Caritas Internationalis, headquartered at the Vatican, 
indicated that it could not, in any case, accept the recommendation of  distribut-
ing condoms. 120 The Minimum Standards eventually recommended condom 
distribution – but with a note at the bottom of  the page specifying that Caritas did 
not endorse this solution. 
 The correspondence held in Sphere’s archives show the experts’ doubts about 
the whole idea of  standards and codification. Why, some asked, choose only five 
sectors (water and sanitation, food security, nutrition, health, shelter and site)? 
Why not propose standards in the matters of, say, education, environment, pro-
tection against physical violence, family tracing of  unaccompanied children, 
psychological/social care, urban agriculture, or the promotion of  gender equal-
ity? 121 Some standards proposed in the process were standards different from those 
envisioned by Stockton and Walker. “The standards describe what people should 
have,” one expert stated. 122 Why not choose “an indicator that would ‘measure’ 
whether we are respecting the dignity and rights of  the affected population,” and 
another “to measure whether we are addressing the potential negative side-effects 
of  the response”? 123 Why not choosing indicators to measure the participation of  
populations receiving aid? 124 Or “standards on consultation and sharing respon-
sibility with beneficiaries”? 125 It is not enough, one expert maintains, to provide 
basic services; one must guarantee “that people are not treated like cattle.” 126 
These alternative standards, however, were all eventually discarded. 
 Can minimum standards be universal? 
 How universal could the minimum standards be? That was probably the most 
debated question. How could one be sure that the minimum standards were valid 
everywhere? The words used by the experts seemed to change their meaning 
depending on context, even the most trivial ones. “I had a phone call the other 
day where we spent 15 minutes talking about what we meant by ‘stove’ – a place 
to cook food; but it’s a three-stone fire here and a cast-iron, gas-fired device there; 
and it has implications for environmental impact, gender roles, health.” 127 And 
the problem did not stop with words. It worsens still with numbers: “[Is] setting 
standards based on requirement figures which are not adequately understood an 
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exercise in false precision?” 128 The Health Manager found it difficult to quantify 
needs: 
 In the previous draft I avoided putting figures to the objectively verifiable 
indicators, which I cannot do for much longer. So in this draft I have inserted 
figures or ranges where possible. The ranges will hopefully be narrowed down 
as time goes on, but some will remain, reflecting different needs in different 
situations. 129 
 Each standard set off  an interminable discussion on the universality of  indica-
tors. Stockton and Walker had hoped that the minimum standards would be valid 
for every kind of  crisis, all over the world – but the experts could not even agree on 
what a “humanitarian crisis” was in the first place. The classic response was to give 
a mortality index: Crisis was defined as the moment where the crude mortality 
rate (CMR) exceeded one death per every 10,000 people per day. 130 Was this defi-
nition applicable to all crises? One commentator wrote: “Crude Mortality Rate 
works best with camps of  displaced [persons] in bad condition. But a lot of  other 
disasters occur in the world.” 131 What if  populations are dispersed and one can-
not calculate the CMR? If  a hurricane destroys crops, its fatal consequences come 
about much later: “Does one wait for Crude Mortality Rates to reach 1/10,000/
day before actually implementing assistance?” 132 Should one really only need to 
consider the number of  deaths, or equally take into account the  causes of  death? “A 
single cholera or yellow fever death would indicate a much more serious situation 
than 50 localised diarrhea deaths.” 133 
 The origin of  this indicator was soon disputed: “The threshold of  1/10,000 per 
day is an approximate doubling of  baseline CMR for most African countries at 
risk of  refugee emergencies. This is therefore not globally applicable.” 134 Could 
one define a “crisis” according to the same criteria in Africa and in Europe? Could 
that which is a crisis somewhere perhaps be considered normal elsewhere? “We 
cannot expect the Sphere Handbook to address problems which are of  a chronic 
developmental nature (i.e. ‘normally’ high CMR),” some argued. 135 So what was 
to be done? 
 Doubling of  the Crude Mortality Rate as indicative of  an emergency is an 
arbitrary indicator and not based on epidemiology. The result is that certain 
mortality rates will be acceptable in certain African contexts, whereas the 
same rates in a European context would demand a humanitarian response. Is 
such a relative standard acceptable? 136 
 The problem of  defining crises was only the first in a long list of  standards whose 
universal application is questionable. One might set the standards in Geneva, 
but the countries themselves have national norms that are unique to them. What 
to make, then, of  “national standards for water treatment, vector control, drug 
choices, etc.”? 137 Independent of  official norms, it is certain that different societ-
ies have different standards for quality of  life, and likewise, the funds assigned 
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by donors to humanitarian interventions in different crises are different. In some 
cases, “the universal minimum may not be good enough,” whereas in others, the 
“minimum cannot be delivered.” 138 Many experts underline that “Many of  the 
minimum standards might exceed those prevailing in the country or region of  
origin.” 139 
 Some experts proposed adopting two sets of  standards: One that would apply 
to “industrialized countries” and one for “developing countries.” But this proposi-
tion was rapidly discarded by the Sphere team, because such a proposition would 
scare off  donors. A representative of  an American NGO explained: “dual stan-
dards which include higher levels of  service for developed world disasters victims 
are impossible to defend politically.” 140 
 Only 13 years later, for the third edition of  the handbook, Sphere resolved 
to integrate different integrators according to societies – classed in large regions 
of  the world. Thus, starting in 2011, a humanitarian crisis would no longer be 
defined universally as a situation provoking more than one death per 10,000 per 
day, but rather 1.07 in sub-Saharan Africa, versus 0.46 in South Asia, 0.15 in 
Latin America, and 0.03 deaths per 10,000 people per day in “industrialized 
countries.” 141 In other words, to be considered a “humanitarian crisis” in Africa, 
a catastrophe now must result in 35 times as many victims as in Europe. For the 
first version of  the Sphere Handbook, however, the choice was made to maintain 
the universal standards. The whole question of  the “vital minimum” was at stake: 
“if  universal standards are in fact not universal, the very concept of  ‘minimum 
standards’ begins to lose meaning.” 142 
 In order to ensure that their standards were universal, the Sphere team turned 
to the “field.” In March 1998 sector managers traversed Europe, Africa, and Asia, 
inviting representatives from NGOs, UN agencies, and national services to com-
ment on the first drafts of  the Standards. In Sarajevo, one expert complained that 
“the standards are too high to be achievable”; 143 in Bangkok, a participant said 
that Sphere has “a very Northern definition” of  gender issues; 144 another said 
that the definition of  crises by the crude mortality rate could not be applied to 
“seasonal/cyclical emergencies” (for example, those caused by monsoons). At the 
Sheraton Hotel in Harare, participants feared a relationship between Western and 
local NGOs that could be “paternalistic.” 145 In Dhaka, they spoke about respect 
for “eating habits,” 146 while in Abidjan, some argued for better “respect of  local 
culture.” 147 
 The question of  respecting local specificities was raised by many persons 
involved in the process, both in the regional meetings and in emails. The Sphere 
team always stood strong, arguing for the necessity of  universal norms. There was, 
however, one notable exception. 
 Some experts suggested inventing standards not on  delivered services and goods, 
but rather on the way the NGOs work. For them, it would be a matter of  turning 
their gaze around: Not toward the finished product, but towards the process, the 
“self  identification of  problems of  self-improvement and of  self-correcting.” 148 
Procedures, for example, to ensure that aid practitioners are properly trained, 
informed, and professional, that there are structures for audit and evaluation, 
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and that judgments are made “by peers working in the same environment under 
the same conditions and not against some relatively arbitrary world-wide stan-
dards.” 149 In fact, the Sphere team had thought about collecting standards for 
“Organizational Best Practices,” which was the title of  a whole chapter in the very 
draft of  the handbook. 150 However, this chapter raised critical questions: “how 
far do you think the Sphere project can go in prescribing for agencies interna-
tional working, rather than their performance?” 151 Comments noted that NGOs 
were much too different to submit to common rules of  operation. Sphere’s first 
draft indicated, for example, that NGOs involved in humanitarian aid should have 
“balanced representation of  women and men in senior management positions at 
headquarters and in the field.” 152 One expert drily noted that such strict indica-
tors risked never being respected: “Most agencies are such a very long way from 
 Figure 4.5  Early draft of  the Sphere Handbook with handwritten annotations (health 
chapter, December 1997). 
Source: The Sphere Archives. Courtesy of  The Sphere Project.
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this . . . All five of  Oxfam UK and Ireland’s most senior managers are middle-
aged white men by the way.” 153 
 For some reasons, of  all the chapters proposed in the early months of  the 
Sphere Handbook, the chapter about the organizational best practices of  NGOs 
was the only one to be entirely suppressed. The argument for suppressing it was 
that it was “too culturally specific.” 154 Thus, the cultural differences between the 
societies benefiting from humanitarian aid were not considered sufficiently impor-
tant to forbid generalizations on a global scale – yet the cultural differences among 
NGOs, by contrast, were considered too great to permit any generalization. 
 The “French letter” and the anti-Sphere coalition 
 In the summer of  1998, Stockton and Walker were almost in the position of  fulfill-
ing the promises they had made to ALNAP a couple of  months earlier: The final 
draft of  the Handbook was almost ready, and now they were discussing the cover 
design and distribution. A set of  major public events was planned for launching 
the Handbook – simultaneously in Washington, London, Geneva, and Nairobi. 155 
The member organizations, field offices, NGO partners, UN institutions, donors, 
and major press outlets were already informed. 156 The first invitations were sent, 
and Peter Walker could announce triumphantly in the press that, thanks to Sphere, 
a “new era” of  humanitarian aid was dawning. 157 
 An unexpected fax changed the general mood. In September 1998 a group 
of  French NGOs had formulated a full-frontal attack on the Sphere Standards. 
These five pages, that the Sphere managers would call the “French letter,” con-
demned the Sphere Project: With these minimum standards, it argued, “the spirit 
of  Henry Dunant, Florence Nightingale and [. . .] hundred[s] of  unknown 
heroes” of  humanitarian aid would be “killed by a bureaucratic, normative stan-
dardization process.” 158 
 According to the French letter, the Minimum Standards would contribute to 
lower the quality of  aid. “Who does it serve really?” it asked, “the beneficiaries? 
The large agencies of  the Western World, or the Donors?” The French letter 
made three arguments: First, contrary to what the Sphere team claims, the stan-
dards were not universally applicable: “these standards seem to apply only in ideal 
camp situations.” But they could not apply for many types of  situations, which 
were thought to be “much more frequent than the ideal one where Sphere recom-
mendations can be utilized.” These standards could not apply in places where 
security could not be assured, resources were lacking, or people were still on the 
move. Thus, “most of  the humanitarian situations would be excluded” from the 
Sphere Standards. 
 The second argument was that standardization did not guarantee quality. “You 
fix your own standards, you declare that you will use them, the fact that you use 
them is certified by an external auditor, you get your ISO Label and you can utilise 
it for advertising and fund raising. This is in no way ensuring that quality will result 
from the normative process.” To bureaucratic norms, the French letter opposed 
another definition of  “real professionalism,” which required “vision, intuition, 
adaptability, imagination and flexibility.” 
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 Third, the Minimum Standards were accused of  ignoring the diversity of  the 
humanitarian community. The donors could use the Minimum Standards to con-
trol the NGOs; and the NGOs from the North could use them to control the 
NGOs from the South. “We are concerned that our sister agencies and colleagues 
from the Southern and Eastern NGOs have been excluded from the process, 
[and] will never be able to abide by this sophisticated list of  standards.” 
 None of  these arguments were new. All arguments of  the French letter were 
already present, in one way or another, in the email exchanges of  experts involved 
in the Sphere process over 1997–1998. But the tone of  the criticism was new. 
Moreover, the French letter was signed by organizations that enjoyed an excel-
lent reputation in Europe and the United States and who the Sphere team just 
could not ignore. Doctors Without Borders, for instance, has considerable pres-
tige; it was a full member of  the Sphere “Management Committee,” was widely 
respected, and would even earn the Nobel Peace Prize a few months later. This 
criticism against Sphere was neither isolated nor was it solely “French.” Within the 
Management Committee, other organizations such as the ICRC were increasingly 
critical of  the standards. 
 The criticism against Sphere soon organized in a “coalition of  the refusal” 159 
organized around MSF, Action Contre la Faim, and Groupe Urgence Réhabilita-
tion Développement. Stockton and Walker fought back by organizing a “coalition 
of  the willing,” 160 and both positions became publicly visible to donors in October 
1998 at the World Aid Congress, where Peter Walker publicized the Minimum 
Standards while URD’s François Grünewald was distributing copies of  the French 
letter. 161 
 Walker and Stockton attempted to re-establish an apparent consensus. 162 They 
made minor changes (“Yes”, he argues, “the Minimum Standards were written 
in a way that suggested they mostly applied to refugee camp situations. This has 
been corrected in the final version”) in order to preserve what was essential (“We 
believe that these standards should apply in all emergencies”). 163 They met with 
the leaders of  MSF and eventually agreed to cancel the triumphant public launch 
of  the handbook – and to replace it with a “debate on the meaning of  standards 
in humanitarianism.” The publication of  the final edition of  the handbook was 
pushed back by one year. The version published in December 1998 would not be a 
“final edition,” but rather only a “preliminary edition.” More importantly, the idea 
of  a “registry” was eliminated – NGOs would no longer be asked to sign this docu-
ment. 164 For Stockton, these concessions were the “price to pay for the prospect of  
a much more united NGO position in support of  the Sphere process overall.” 165 
 But while they were negotiating with the “anti-Sphere” coalition, they were 
losing support from the other side of  the Atlantic: 166 the American partner NGOs 
refused to adopt the deal between Sphere and MSF. The representant of  an 
American NGOs wrote: 
 Let me repeat for the record what I have told Peter and Nick by phone. There 
is no repeat no agreement by [our NGO] to state a debate on the Mini-
mum Standards. No commitment should be made to MSF that there will be 
a debate in Washington on December 3. 167 
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 The enthusiasm of  the summer was gone. Mere weeks away from the public 
launch of  the Minimum Standards, the project was close to dissolving. “As you 
are aware, we are now well past the 11th hour,” Stockton worried. 168 We are “not 
prepared to be bulldozed along by the process,” MSF replied. 169 The Sphere Proj-
ect now had “a political problem.” As Stockton explained: The unity of  the NGO 
community – especially the “clarity of  the Message to Donors” was at stake. 170 
 The hurdle was to define what “universal” meant. Stockton, eager to save the 
standards, offered a compromise: The standards were “universal” but “the appli-
cation of  the standards must be tailored to each unique situation.” 171 On the 3 
December 1998, instead of  a glorious book launch in four cities on three conti-
nents, a “debate” was held at the Commonwealth Conference Center in London 172 
in front of  the donors and the press. 173 Two conceptions of  minimum standards 
were clashing: For some, “The Sphere standards seek to be universal, applicable 
to all response agencies and all disasters.” 174 While for others, “[Humanitarian 
aid] is a very difficult process, not easily open to standardized or algorithmic 
approaches.” 175 For some, minimum standards would help improve the quality 
of  aid. For others, conversely, it could be a tool for “those who wish to privatize 
humanitarian action so that it becomes a commodity or service product, open to 
subcontracting.” 176 
 Eventually, the Sphere Minimum Standards succeeded in becoming a staple ref-
erence in humanitarian aid. The Sphere Handbook was regularly updated (2000, 
2004, 2011, 2018), and is today being used by hundreds of  NGOs, donors, and 
even governmental agencies. 177 The Sphere standards are taught to thousands of  
aid workers in the field and to students in university programs. 178 
 At the same time however, the signatories of  the French letter organized 
a veritable campaign against Sphere. 179 The “coalition of  refusal” utilized the 
vocabulary of  military strategy, and talked about an “offensive against Sphere,” 
an “opposition,” a “strategy,” and several “fronts.” 180 The “coalition of  refusal” 
resisted the consensual vision of  humanitarian aid that the Sphere Project pro-
vided, “the myth of  ‘homogeneous humanitarians.’” 181 This position was made 
possible by the fact that, unlike other NGOs that received the essential part of  
their funding from large public donors, MSF and their allies received most of  their 
funds from private donations. The NGOs most critical of  Sphere (Action Contre 
la Faim, Médecins du Monde, Médecins Sans Frontière France, etc.) had relatively 
small budgets in comparison with large NGOs like Oxfam or the LWF, and were 
specialized in specific niches, especially nutritional or medical aid, often in conflict 
zones and areas that were difficult to access. Yet it was precisely in these zones that 
were the most difficult to access (and therefore abandoned by the largest NGOs), 
that the standards were the most difficult to attain – hence these NGOs’ fear that 
setting some standards based on camp situation would make it difficult for them to 
act in more difficult contexts. They insisted on the importance of  on-site presence, 
on the question of  protection from physical violence, and on the legal responsibil-
ity of  governments. 182 
 The “coalition of  refusal” diffused “briefing note” and “position papers” to 
inform their own staff  about the pitfalls of  standardization 183 They asked their 
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staff  to refuse to attend Sphere trainings that they considered being “brainwash-
ing sessions.” 184 MSF and the ICRC put the brakes on the Sphere team’s work. 
They systematically repeated their doubts about the project .185 For its part, 
the URD met with the Sphere Managers to influence the project and obtain 
concessions. 186 Another strategy was to go public with their criticisms. URD and 
MSF distributed anti-Sphere positions in all major humanitarian fora (ALNAP, 
VOICE, Henri Dunant Centre, etc.). In February 2000, while MSF International 
publicly announced that it was quitting the Sphere Project, MSF managers multi-
plied workshops, conferences, interviews articles, and book publications attacking 
standardization. 187 Andre Griekspoor and Steve Collins showed, for example, the 
case of  South Sudan, where nutritional standards were able to be attained – but 
only by artificially reducing the number of  beneficiaries of  a project. The stan-
dards were attained for a small number of  beneficiaries, but the less-accessible 
populations were ignored. 188 A crucial target for the anti-Sphere coalition was 
the donors. They sent a letter denouncing the Minimum Standards to about 
100 political leaders, donors, and NGOs, ranging from the European Commis-
sion charged with humanitarian action to the director of  the DFID, through the 
French minister of  foreign affairs: “The standardization procedure,” they wrote, 
“could have serious operational consequences.” 189 They demanded that Sphere 
would not be considered the “quality reference” for humanitarian action. 
 Finally, the anti-Sphere coalition offered some counter propositions: A “Quality 
Hub” to develop new tools to evaluate the quality of  humanitarian aid. Differently 
from Sphere, the “Quality Project” did not propose a series of  standards on the 
products and services delivered to aid recipients. 190 
 The attacks of  the anti-Sphere coalition paid off. The Minimum Standards 
were considerably weakened by the criticism: The chapter of  the handbook on 
“best practices” was suppressed, the project of  a “registry” of  NGOs that adhere 
to the standards was abandoned, as was the idea of  creating an “ombudsman” to 
overview NGOs. 191 Notwithstanding these limits, the Sphere Project had a long 
legacy. Many projects for aid standardization that differ from Sphere exist today, 
including HAP (Humanitarian Accountability Partnership), 192 People in Aid, and 
the Quality Project. However, these projects have wound up connecting with each 
other (notably within the context of  the “Core Humanitarian Standards Alli-
ance”) as well as with the Sphere Project. The 2018 version of  the Sphere Mini-
mum Standards thus included a chapter on “Core Humanitarian Standards” that 
endorsed this late alliance between Sphere and the Quality Project (that initially 
was created within the anti-Sphere coalition). 193 
 Speaking for humanity. The elementary forms 
of  humanitarian consensus 
 The Sphere Project contributed to creating what the anthropologist Marion Fresia 
calls a “global norm”: A norm that shifts problems of  political origin toward the 
technical and judicial fields. 194 But how did the Sphere team create legitimacy for 
a norm that, if  one believes the  Handbook , concerns the entire world population? 
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How could the few people that constituted the Sphere team speak in the name of  
humanity? 
 The mode of  decision that Sphere employed does not resemble the mode of  
decision used in the scientific domain (which has been well described by the anthro-
pology of  sciences). 195 Even if  the Sphere Project used the vocabulary of  science, 
the arenas involved in the decision were not the scientific arenas (laboratories, peer 
review journals, scientific conferences, etc.). The mode of  decision of  Sphere also 
does not resemble the mode of  decision employed in political decisions via the 
vote (there was no counting of  votes in the decisions made by the Sphere Project 
about the indicators). 
 The mode of  decision adopted by Sphere bears the most similarity to the 
model of  “decision by apparent consensus” described by the sociologist Philippe 
Urfalino. 196 This decision-making model neither supposes unanimity nor a vote 
(that is, any technique of  counting up opinions). It is a “shutdown mode of  col-
lective decision-making that, contrary to the vote, does not have the counting of  
opinions as a precondition.” 197 It is a decision-making model that is often found in 
specialist commissions. 198 The crucial point is that “consensus is not equivalent to 
real unanimity, but to the consent of  diffident minorities” as Urfalino explains. 199 
In other words, apparent consensus is obtained when a “final proposition, cor-
responding in fact to a packet of  choices and expectations, does not sustain any 
more objections.” 200 “Apparent consensus does not require unanimity but, on the 
side of  those who approve, the consent of  the diffident.” 201 The decision by con-
sensus thus supposes “the manifest absence of  opposition to a proposition.” 202 
 Thereupon is the Sphere team’s tenacity in convincing the project’s detractors – 
including the signatories of  the French letter – more understandable. In the absence 
of  apparent legitimacy or of  a higher body that could arbitrate (the Sphere team 
was neither elected by a group of  NGOs, nor mandated by an international 
organization arising from nations), the Sphere team had to construct an “appar-
ent consensus,” that is, it must proceed by “the exhaustion of  acceptable objec-
tions.” 203 How did the Sphere team thus seek to attain consensus? Let us have a 
look at four elementary forms of  the construction of  the consensus used by the 
Sphere team: 
 (1) The first technique was to  frame the debate: For the Sphere team, the princi-
pal tension resided in the necessity of  obtaining a large enough consensus, while 
keeping mastery of  the content. For the Minimum Standards to be accepted as a 
reference tool, numerous organizations had to be involved in the process (a “broad 
buy-in,” in Sphere’s terms). But for the tool to keep the Sphere signature, the 
small team in Geneva had to keep the hand on the principal decisions. The list 
of  “acknowledgements” listed in the Sphere Handbook depicts this particular 
form of  collective decision-making. 204 This list of  everyone who participated in 
the handbook spanned 20 pages (constituting 6% of  the publication). 205 It was at 
once long, suggesting a decision made by a numerous assembly, a solid consensus, 
neutral and objective. 206 The production of  consensus was fundamental for the 
success of  the project. The letter that accompanies the preliminary version of  the 
handbook in 1998 pointed out: 
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 This handbook represents the combined efforts of  641 named individuals 
(and countless un-named persons) drawn from some 228 organisations includ-
ing NGOs, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, academic institutions, 
the United Nations and governmental agencies . . . [and] financial donations 
from 8 non-governmental networks and 10 governmental donors. 207 
 In the rhetoric of  the project, there was a tautology between the “consensus” 
represented by the Standards and the common “identity” of  the actors implicated 
in the consensus. For the Sphere team, the project was not just a result of  its con-
tents, “it is also about forging a common humanitarian identity.” 208 It was about 
“the big banana,” the “collective of  NGOs.” 209 As Nicholas Stockton put it: “‘We,’ 
here, is not the ICRC, Oxfam, SCF, or CARE. It is the humanitarian community 
at large, shorn of  flags, logos, T-shirts, slogans and unusually, of  hierarchy.” 210 
From year to year, the Sphere team endeavored to increase the number of  organi-
zations and individuals involved in the project. In 1999, the team announced that 
it had obtained “feedback” through “field testing” from 5 European organizations, 
6 United States organizations, 4 South Asian organizations, 3 African organiza-
tions, 1 Middle Eastern organization, and 1 Latin American organization. 211 The 
2004 version of  the handbook even counted 4,000 individuals and 400 organiza-
tions in 80 countries. 212 
 Each individual who sent in commentary or participated in a meeting orga-
nized by Sphere was meticulously counted by the team: “it boosts the number of  
direct participants,” a member explained. 213 One of  the objectives is that the lead-
ers of  the project should be able to say: “we have tried our absolute best to be as 
inclusive as possible.” 214 But that of  course does not presume equal participation 
in the content. The number of  participants was large, but for one thing, it did not 
extend to everyone (for instance, in 1998, only experts who could communicate in 
English where involved). For another, all the participants were not involved in the 
same way At the center of  the decision-making process, one found a small group 
of  experts and NGOs that were relatively close to each other (Oxfam, IFRC, LWF, 
etc.). 
 “Framing the debate” did not concern only the extent of  the conversation, but 
also its temporal framework. The rhythm and the “logic of  the project” 215 were 
crucial. The “logframe” of  the humanitarian project always involves a project 
holder, donors, a budget, an objective, and a temporal framework, a deadline. 216 
This framework was a constraint, but it also offered Stockton and Walker a pow-
erful leverage to “finalize” the debate. That is just how one of  their colleagues 
understood it; he counseled them to end the debate by laying the criticisms of  
Sphere before the  fait accompli : 
 I don’t think that you should spend too much time worrying about those who 
for the moment seem to be dropping support for Sphere. Your top prior-
ity should be to find ways of  demonstrating both that Sphere works and is 
worthwhile in terms of  improving the quality of  humanitarian aid. Once this 
is done I suspect objections in principle will mysteriously disappear! 217 
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 However, the logic of  the project allows for better than a single ultimatum. It allows 
one to renew the “deadline” as a range. The Sphere Project was planned to last for 
one year, and to produce a “final product” in June 1998. This date was first pushed 
back to December 1998, then the project was renewed for a Phase II (1999), then 
for a Phase III, etc. This series of  deadlines yielded horizons of  expectation that 
were concrete – and extendible. As long as it had funding, the project could pub-
lish results with regular deadlines, and thus give the impression of  a solid and 
permanent consensus. 
 The temporal framework of  the “project” also allowed it to refer criticism  outside 
the temporal limits of  the project: That is, either to a later phase of  the project 
(“this is for Phase II”), or, more often, to the prior history of  the project, and thus 
outside the decision-making area. To defend itself, the Sphere team thus often 
pointed out that many decisions had already been made by others in the past; this 
argument was meant to put an end to the discussion by relying on a compromise 
already adopted by the collective: “we kept on saying that in general Sphere does 
not invent anything, but bases everything on existing material.” 218 
 (2) The second technique to reach apparent consensus was to  domesticate the 
critique. The Sphere archives show that, faced with the many criticisms that the 
project provokes, there was no unique response, but a series of  micro-strategies 
that sought to disarm the criticism in order to protect the core of  the project. 
The most prevalent tactic was, as described before, confining critique to “techni-
cal” discussions. Time and time again, the Sphere team endeavored to translate 
political questions into technical questions – as indicated by their response to the 
French letter, a political criticism, but one to which it was replied: “almost all 
of  your questions have been addressed in this final version of  the Sphere stan-
dards.” 219 One of  the preliminaries to this tactic was to create a detailed inventory 
of  the critiques, in order to multiply them and to be able to deal with them one by 
one while remaining within the framework of  the project. While some critiques, 
taken individually, could throw the legitimacy of  the entire project into doubt (for 
example, the point that “Southern NGOs” had been excluded from the process), 
they would find themselves, within a list, “drowned” in a series of  small technical 
points. 220 
 This method of  minimizing critique echoed the opposite technique, that of  
dramatization and caricature of  critique, whether to make it ridiculous (French 
letter) or to make it too general to be taken seriously (the Sphere Project team thus 
sometimes ironically called itself  the “Fear Project” to defuse concerns). Thus, in 
an article that responded to the critiques formulated by MSF and the URD, Ed 
Schenkenberg van Mierop created a pastiche of  the critiques addressed to Sphere, 
concluding: The “Sphere project was not conceived to become the McDonald’s [sic] 
of  humanitarianism.” 221 
 In the end, once the techniques mentioned above were no longer effective, 
one could always choose simply to ignore the critique, or to override it. In many 
instances, the experts who gave their opinions on the Minimum Standards noted 
that their opinions were not heeded: “Our proposal [was] not taken into account,” 
one of  them wrote. 222 The extent of  the “discussion” provoked by Sphere should 
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not make one forget that the drafting of  the text primarily remained in the hands 
of  the project leaders. This point is true even for sector managers, some of  whom 
express their dissatisfaction with the final product: 
 In honesty S., when Anna and I read the nutrition chapter our hearts sank – it 
appeared that much of  our careful thinking and deliberations with our work-
ing group had been overwritten in one editorial swoop. . . . [The section] does 
not comprehensively reflect the work of  the nutrition sector . . . [This is] a 
product which we weren’t expecting and which appears to undermine our 
whole approach over the last three months. 223 
 (3) The third technique to obtain a consensus was to  integrate the critiques. One 
of  the undeniable strengths of  the Sphere Project was its ability to integrate cri-
tiques to improve the final product. There again, this integration could take many 
forms: At several key moments, the Sphere Project was capable of  inflecting the 
project to respond to certain critiques. For example, in the 1998 edition, the chap-
ter on “organizational best practices” was omitted; the 2004 edition included a 
new chapter on “standards common to all sectors” (gender equality, children’s 
rights, protection); 224 a new chapter entirely dedicated to “protection” was inte-
grated in the 2001 version, etc. All the same, the terms of  the debate were pro-
gressively modified. The word “standards” had changed. In 1998, the phrases 
“standards,” “technical standards,” and “indicators” were used indistinctly from 
each other. In 2000, the term “standards” (whose application is universal) was dis-
tinguished from the term “indicator” (whose application is contextual, and which 
serves to measure the standard). 225 Likewise, certain qualitative indicators were 
progressively transformed into quantitative indicators. 
 The content of  the Standards thus always proceeded from the state of  the bal-
ance of  power at the moment of  the Standards’ publication. This state of  affairs 
was particularly visible in the integration of  references to the handbook, which 
were, also, a non-governmental diplomatic tool – it is the actors themselves who 
talked of  “diplomacy.” 226 The integration of  the critique sometimes took the form 
of  personnel management (for example, in May 2000, the Sphere team recruited 
“two participants from French NGO community”). 227 
 The subtlest way of  integrating critique, however, was the celebration of  the 
culture of  “debate.” Thus, in their narrative, Stockton and Walker always accord 
a place, admittedly minor, but always present, to criticism against Sphere. 228 The 
official version of  Sphere’s story on the project’s website does not neglect to men-
tion the critiques against it. The taking into account of  critique thus became a 
central argument of  the validity of  the project. For one thing, critique allowed the 
project to be bounced around, by organizing new meetings, new workshops, new 
publications, “pilot projects,” updated versions of  the handbook, etc. The project 
was all the more visible for its sustaining of  criticism and public controversy. 
 For another, criticism allowed the team to celebrate their ability to self-criticize 
and their culture of  “debate”: “The Sphere Management Committee welcomes 
dialogue,” 229 wrote Nicholas Stockton. At the height of  the polemic, the defense 
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of  the project could thus be summed up as a celebration of  debate: “Hence, the 
debate will, and should, continue, as a genuine humanitarian community is all 
about debate.” 230 
 (4) Finally, a fourth technique was to craft a  language of  consent. The work on 
language is a crucial element of  the construction of  consensus. During the first 
phase of  Sphere, the most valued language resources were the language of  science 
and the language of  law. The language of  management was present as well, in the 
first drafts of  the project (which talked, for example, about “consumer rights” and 
thus identified catastrophe victims as consumers), 231 but that was increasingly less 
valued. The language of  science, notably of  numbers, was perceived as an impor-
tant guarantor. For example, “objectively verifiable indicators” were frequently 
discussed. 232 Sphere’s ability to attach numbers to human necessities (2,100 kcal, 
15 liters of  water per person per day, etc.) was a central element of  justification. 233 
At the height of  the controversy about Sphere, in November 1998, a solution to 
the crisis was found by promoting “testing” the standards in the field, like a scien-
tific experiment of  falsification, according to the model of  the “field trials” used 
by scientists. “Stick with the universal language of  science,” one ally counseled. 234 
All the same, the language of  science had its limits, too. On several occasions, the 
Sphere critics asserted that this or that number was “arbitrary,” or that the studies 
on this or that subject were too lacking to make an objective decision: The lan-
guage of  science thus was a double-edged sword. 
 Judicial language constituted a second asset. It is the subject of  the first part of  
the handbook: The  Humanitarian Charter , a summary of  international laws show-
ing that people affected by disaster had “a right to assistance.” 235 All standards 
contained in the handbook were said to be derived from this right to assistance. 236 
The standards were defined as “what it takes to satisfy the legal obligations.” 237 The 
recourse to the vocabulary of  law and the invocation of  binding documents like 
the  Geneva Conventions of  1949 and the  Universal Declaration of  Human Rights of   1948 
were meant to lend a strong sense of  legitimacy to the “Minimum Standards.” But 
the language of  law could also be a double-edged sword: Would a document that 
is too juridical not be admissible in trials against NGOs or states, asked a leader 
of  an American NGO? 
 Those we seek to assist are traumatized by their circumstances and many will 
find fault with the services provided them regardless of  the standards of  ser-
vices delivery, because they are in shock, burdened by grief, or otherwise not 
their normal selves. As an American accustomed to our litigious society, you 
will appreciate that American agencies are unlikely to accept this language. 238 
 This aid worker understood this position: “[Donors] would go crazy if  we told 
them shelter was a right. Can you imagine someone suing the US State Depart-
ment for human rights violations for not giving them adequate shelter?” 239 Thus 
neither the language of  science nor the language of  law could satisfy the exigences 
of  humanitarian consensus. A third resource, however, might be called a “lan-
guage of  ambiguity”: 
Standards: The Sphere Project and the universalization of  the minimum after Goma 151
 I think the document should be purposively ambiguous in some of  its lan-
guage. This would accommodate circumstances which will be beyond the 
control of  NGOs which subscribe to it. Ambiguity also will permit multiple 
interpretations of  concepts likely to become  casus belli . 240 
 In the whole redaction of  the Standards, here was a tension between the desire 
to make a document that is legible and accessible to the greatest number (“user-
friendly”), on the one hand, and the desire to maintain a vocabulary that permits 
NGOs and donors to recognize their contribution and their sentences in the text, 
on the other hand. Thus, the editor of  the first version of  the Handbook was 
asked not to simplify its vocabulary too much: 241 
 Often I have used words to allow the contributing person or agency to rec-
ognize themselves in the document. It’s important that all agencies see them-
selves and can identify themselves with these standards. So apart from my 
Dutch English, which you must correct, you should not change too much. 242 
 As a result, several readers complained about the ambiguity of  certain terms 
and the difficulty of  reading the document. “Even with English as a first lan-
guage, I have to confess to being a bit vague about, e.g.  carrying capacity of  the area, 
environmentally innocuous, gender disaggregated .” 243 This ambiguity, however, was not 
by accident. The style of  the text of  the Minimum Standards paid the price of  
crafting consensus. 244 
 Conclusion 
 The Sphere Project has been a success, if  one judges it by the number of  organiza-
tions that use the Sphere Handbook as a reference. One may doubt that Sphere 
has opened a “new era” in humanitarian aid 245 or even that it was “the first attempt 
to produce globally applicable minimum standards for humanitarian response ser-
vices.” 246 But Sphere did mark a moment in the governmentality of  humanitar-
ian NGOs. Whether they intend to apply the Minimum Standards or not, relief  
NGOs have to take these kinds of  Standards into account – because they matter for 
donors, for government, for UN agencies, for other NGOs, etc. It is very difficult 
to estimate the real effects of  the Sphere Standards on the populations receiving 
aid (there is a broad controversy on this, and it is not the aim of  this book to take 
part in these discussions). 247 In practice, many humanitarian projects are evaluated, 
compared, or planned along the Sphere Standards (for instance with sentences 
such as “70% of  the Sphere Standard for the daily food ration has been attained 
for the population of  this camp over period XY”). Thus, if  the effects of  humani-
tarian standards on the recipients of  aid are not clear, the effects on NGO workers 
are almost certain: They have to spend time and energy to acquire competence on 
them – whether to implement them, or to explain why they do not. 
 This rise of  statistical rationale in the humanitarian field took place indepen-
dently from the fact that the results of  the Sphere Project were rather far off  from 
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the initial project as envisioned in the 1990s. In 1998, Peter Walker anticipated 
“7 steps for improving standards.” 248 Only the first stage in his list was eventually 
realized: That there is a list of  “Standards.” But all the instruments that should 
have guaranteed the application of  the standards have progressively been elim-
inated from the initial project: The chapter on “organizational best practices” 
was deleted, the “registry of  NGOs which are complying” was eliminated, the 
idea of  a “complaints procedure” was abandoned, as was the idea of  creating an 
“ombudsman” function that would have guaranteed the application of  the stan-
dards. 249 The anti-Sphere coalition led by MSF as well as other forms of  critique 
of  the project of  standardization have also thus attained many of  their objectives 
by altering the initial project. 
 However, and this is an important aspect, the Sphere Project and its critics 
share, despite their opposition, numerous common points. For Sphere’s detrac-
tors, this project constituted a “technocratic deviation” from humanitarian aid. 250 
But certain fundamentals were not the subject of  doubt: For example, the idea that 
the improvement of  aid went through a codification and a reinforcement of  the 
humanitarian “principles” seemed largely to be shared. 251 Likewise, the idea that 
the goal of  humanitarian aid could benefit from quantification in order to render 
different societies commensurable seemed largely to be shared (for example, the 
calculations of   mortality and  morbidity ). 252 The most serious critique of  the Sphere 
standards was thus driven, paradoxically, by a reasoning that was just as positivist 
and objectivist as the Sphere Project itself. 253 
 Thus, Sphere constitutes an important moment of  reflexivity in the history of  
humanitarian NGOs. A small group of  humanitarian entrepreneurs seized control 
of  critique of  humanitarianism after Goma, and internally formulated a reflection 
on what Gregory Mann calls “nongovernmentality”: 254 However, in a surprising 
way, this self-criticism brought its effort of  reflection to bear on the image of  
 aid receiving individuals , much more than on the  institutions that structure the social 
world. Stockton, Walker, and their team deployed their rich reserves of  energy and 
imagination to construct a consensus on the rights and needs of  aid recipients. But 
they quickly ran aground in reflecting on the rights, needs, and duties of  those who 
helped them – whether humanitarian workers or other categories of  volunteers, 
professionals, or local functionaries who work on-site. We might live in a world 
in which it is easier to imagine that  essential needs are universal than to imagine 
that  working conditions could be universal. It was unimaginable, for Sphere, to pose 
the question of  a universal salary for all NGO employees, independently of  their 
place of  work. 255 In the world imagined by Sphere, institutions are thus surpris-
ingly absent. Humanitarian standards invent an immediate connection between a 
universalist ontology, supported by a higher body and outside of  society (science 
or the law) and individuals, taken in isolation and decontextualized (the aid ben-
eficiaries). For example, the Minimum Standards multiply the numerical “indi-
cators,” but without asking about the production of  these numbers by different 
institutions, with different histories and models of  calculation. 
 This concealment of  institutions thus leads Sphere to continue to fight, 20 years 
after its inauguration in London, with the central contradiction between a 
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globalist ideology and a description of  institutions. To one expert from the CDC 
who explains that “no exception” to compliance with Minimum Standards should 
be permitted, because “if  they really are minimal they should be met,” another 
expert responds that “several organizations in the room had reported that neither 
they nor their overseas affiliates would be able to conform to the Minimum Stan-
dards without Project assistance.” 256 In the end, the Sphere Project was able to 
respond to a crisis and material situation (the part of  public humanitarian fund-
ing channeled through NGOs rose again at the end of  the 1990s), 257 but without 
resolving the question of  its legitimacy. As one expert consulted by Sphere thus 
wrote: “I am uncomfortable with defining such a minimal list of  good for various 
reasons: Who defined it? Who has the right to define it?” 258 
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